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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ALBERT EDMUND BARLOW, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8533 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 31, 1955, the defendant was charged with 
the offense of unlawful cohabitation in violation of Section 
76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953. He waived preliminary hearing 
and an information was filed on December 23, 1955. A bill 
of particulars was demanded on December 31, 1955 and 
supplied January 13, 1956, along with an amended infor-
mation. Defendant filed a motion to quash which was heard 
on January 19, 1956, and denied. D~fendant then entered 
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a plea of not guilty, and a jury trial was had March 12 and 
13, 1956. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and sen-
tence was imposed March 22, 1956. The defendant appeals 
from that conviction and sentence. 
The State called 22 witnesses at the trial. The evidence, 
including the testimony of those witnesses and the stipula-
tions agreed to, showed that within the period charged in 
the information, and concurrently, the defendant: {1) Was 
legally married to Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow, intro-
duced her to other persons as his wife and was introduced 
to other persons by her as her husband; (2) Introduced 
Maurine Owen Barlow to other persons as his wife; (3) 
Ate his meals in the different homes of Amanda Kate Kil-
grow Barlow, Maurine Owen Barlow and Vio Fraser Bar-
low, respectively; ( 4) Stayed overnight at the homes of 
Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow and Maurine Owen Barlow 
and visited frequently at the home of Vio Fraser Barlow; 
( 5) Fathered two children born to Maurine Owen Barlow; 
(6) Referred to Maurine Owen Barlow's pregnancy as his 
wife's pregnancy; (7) Was present at the birth of one of 
the babies born to Maurine Owen Barlow and either stated 
to the attending doctor that he was the father, or voiced no 
protest when Maurine so stated; (8) Came and went from 
the different homes in his automobiles with each of the three 
women named in the information and on occasion with all 
three at the same time. Upon this and other evidence in 
the record, the jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful 
cohabitation as charged. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
A. 
THE STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE IN-
VOLVED, SECTION 76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953, 
CONTAINS AN IMPLIED TIME FACTOR. 
B. 
THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE DEFEN-
DANT WITH ONLY ONE OFFENSE. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE OF JUROR 
ORRAN WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
POINT III. 
THE JURY WAS SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCT-




EVIDENCE DESCRIBING CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXISTING PRIOR TO THE TIME OF THE 
OFFENSE CHARGED WAS RELEVANT TO 
SHOW A CONTINUING CONDITION. 
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B. 
NONE OF THE EVIDENCE COMPLAINED OF 
BY DEFENDANT WAS HEARSAY. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-




THE STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE IN-
VOLVED, SECTION 76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953, 
CONTAINS AN IMPLIED TIME FACTOR. 
Section 76-53-2, U. C. A. 1953, reads in part: 
"If any person cohabits with more than one 
person of the opposite sex such person is guilty of 
a felony." 
In his brief defendant argues that the statute does not say 
"at the same time" and is therefore ambiguous. He selects 
by way of illustration the case of a divorcee or widower 
who, within a four year period, marries again and asks 
if they have not in fact violated the statute. The answer 
is no. 
It is fundamental to criminal law that all elements 
which constitute an offense must exist concurrently, other-
wise the offense is not committed. If, for example, A mar-
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ries X, cohabits with her and holds her out to the world 
as his wife, and after her death marries Y, cohabits with 
her and holds her out as his wife, how could it be said that 
he has violated the statute? At what point, or over what 
period of time, has he cohabited: with more than one person 
of the opposite sex? At the time he cohabited with X, Y 
had not entered the picture, and at the time he cohabited 
with Y, X was dead. There is no concurrence of the two 
periods of cohabitation and consequently no crime. 
The point is illustrated by the familiar requirement 
that there is no crime unless the intent and the criminal 
act concur. Section 76-1-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; 
Burdick Law of Crime, Sec. 115. Further illustration lies 
in the Code section defining first degree burglary, 76-9-1, 
U. C. A. 1953. If B, carrying a satchel full of nitroglycerin, 
forcibly breaks and enters in the daytime a structure in 
which a safe is kept, and conceals himself until dark, at 
which time he blows the safe and takes the money, he pre-
sumably is not guilty of first degree burglary because the 
breaking and entering was not in the nighttime. Yet no-
where does that section require that all the elements com-
prising the offense must be present concurrently. That 
requirement is implied. 
In this case the defendant is charged with cohabiting 
with three women from April 30, 1952 to October 31, 1955, 
a three and one-half year period. Had the evidence shown 
that he cohabited with Amanda Kate Kilgrow Barlow in 
1952, Maurin Owen Barlow in 1953, and Vio Fraser Barlow 
in 1954, then at no point within the period charged would 
he have been cohabiting "with more than one person of the 
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opposite sex" but the evidence showed that he cohabited 
with all of them concurrently. 
B. 
THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE DEFEN-
DANT 'VITH ONLY ONE OFFENSE. 
Defendant argues next that he is charged with three 
offenses because three women were named in the infor-
mation and there are three possible findings which would 
sustain a conviction. The answer is that the offense created 
by the Legislature is cohabitation with more than one 
person of the opposite sex and proof of concurrent cohabi-
tation with any number from two on up will sustain a con-
viction. 
If the defendant's contention had merit it would be 
difficult to uphold, for example, the universally accepted 
method of charging and proving the theft of more than one 
article in one transaction. The general rule is that where 
two or more articles are stolen together the theft may, in 
fact must, be charged in one count .. Wharton's Criminal 
Law, 12th Edition, Section 1171. The rule is the same even 
where the individual articles stolen are separately owned. 
State v. McKee, (1898), 17 U. 370, 53 P. 733; State v. 
Mickel, (1901), 23 U. 507, 65 P. 484. 
Suppose, then, that X steals articles A, B, and C, each 
worth $30.00, and is charged in a single count with grand 
larceny. The value of the articles stolen is one of the ele-
ments of the crime to be proved. State v. Lawrence, ( 1951), 
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... U. . .. , 234 P. 2d 600. There is. a dispute in the evidence 
on whether the defendant purchased the articles. The jury 
returns a verdict of guilty as charged. There is no way 
of knowing in such a case whether the jury found that 
the defendant stole all three articles or only two of them, 
and if only two, which two. Yet it has not successfully been 
contended that such a conviction will not stand because the 
defendant was charged with three crimes. The reason is 
that the Legislature has said that grand larceny is the 
felonious stealing, etc. of the personal property of another 
of a value in excess of $50.00, and whether the proof shows 
it to have been one article or three· articles is immaterial. 
The Legislature has likewise said that it shall be a felony 
to cohabit with more than one person of the opposite sex 
and it doesn't matter how many more than one. It is the 
position of the State that the conviction in this case would 
be an unconditional bar to a subsequent prosecution for 
unlawful cohabitation alleged to have been committed at 
the same time as that charged here, whether the women 
involved were named in this information or not. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE OF JUROR 
OHRAN WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
On voir dire of the jury panel, it was brought out that 
juror Ohran was acquainted with the· defendant, the latter 
having done some work as a carpenter for Mr. Ohran some 
three years previously (R. 39). The District Attorney later 
inquired whether Mr. Ohran during that acquaintance had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
become sufficiently familiar with the defendant's family 
life that his judgment might be affected one way or the 
other. The record at that point (R. 51) reads: 
"MR. OHRAN: No, I didn't know at that time. 
Since that time and I guess I have been a little ac-
quainted with it we have had a girl who is in a 
similar circumstance work for us and talked about 
it. 
"MR. ANDERSON: You have no direct knowl-
edge of his family circumstance? 
"MR. OHRAN: No, I don't know Mr. Barlow's 
family at all." 
Defense counsel then challenged lVIr. Ohran for cause and 
the court proceeded to make further inquiry in order to 
determine whether he was in fact biased. The record con-
tinues (R. 52-53) : 
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran, do you have any 
knowledge that you would act upon in the trial of 
this matter, independent from what the evidence 
might or might not show? 
"MR. OHRAN: No. I stated I would judge it 
on the weight of the evidence, but I do have that 
knowledge of several people. 
"THE COURT: Whatever knowledge you have 
in reference to Mr. Barlow is through hearsay and 
gossip that you may have heard? 
"MR. OHRAN: And what I have read in the 
papers. 
"THE COURT: And what you have read in the 
papers? 
"MR. OHRAN: Yes. 
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"THE COURT: And at this time do you still 
indulge, so far as he is concerned, in the presump-
tion of innocence and presume that he is innocent 
until he would be proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt? 
"MR. OHRAN: Oh, I think I would. 
"THE COURT: Well, I mean is your feeling 
towards Mr. Barlow at this time that he is presumed 
innocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt? 
"MR. ORRAN: Yes. I would judge that. 
"MR. HATCH : I would ask the Court to ask 
Mr. Ohran if prior to this time he has formed an 
opinion as to Mr. Barlow's present marital status? 
"MR. OHRAN: No. Just what has been in the 
paper. I think every informed person in reading it 
they assume that there is something connected to it. 
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ohran, you have 
served as a juror here many times, haven't you, in 
criminal cases? 
"MR. OHRAN: Yes sir. 
"THE COURT: And you have heard my state-
ment to the effect that the fact the defendant is 
charged by the information of the District Attorney 
is no evidence of his guilt. Would you treat Mr. 
Barlow with that legal proposition in this matter? 
"MR. OHRAN: I think I would. 
"THE COURT: And the fact that he has been 
charged you would not assume from that, that that 
was any evidence of his guilt or that he was. guilty? 
"MR. OHRAN: No. 
"MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, the State 
would resist the challenge that was made. Of course 
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we would leave it up to Your Honor but I think in 
fairness I should state that. 
"MR. HATCH: I should like to ask him one 
more question. 
"THE COURT: You may. 
"MR. HATCH: On what basis do you make 
the statement 'That we had a girl working that was 
in a similar position or condition' if you have formed 
no opinion? 
"MR. OHRAN: Well this girl's husband was 
put in jail for that about two months ago. 
"MR. HATCH : On the basis of that statement 
I will renew my motion to challenge for cause. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran if you were in the 
position of this defendant and the State of Utah 
would you be willing to submit your case to eight 
men like yourself? 
"MR. OHRAN: I think I would. 
"THE COURT: I don't think he shows any im-
partiality." 
At no time did Mr. Ohran express an unqualified opin-
ion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant or demon-
strate that he had formed such an opinion. On the contrary, 
his answers show that any notion he had concerning the 
defendant's marital status was the result of newspaper 
reading and hearsay. He acknowledged having had conver-
sations with a girl who said her husband had been put in 
jail, apparently for the same offense. But the record does 
not show, as stated in defendant's brief at page 19, that 
"the defendant was 'in the same situation as the husband 
of the girl working for him who had been put in jail for 
that about two months ago'." The most the record shows 
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on this point is that Mr. Ohran was acquainted with people 
who had been involved more or less intimately in situa-
tions which may have grown out of the offense with which 
the defendant was charged. 
The defendant's argument that Mr. Ohran was not 
impartial cannot stand in the face of the answers given by 
him to questions from the court. The above quoted portions 
of the record show statements by the challenged juror that 
he would act on the evidence produced in court and not on 
some other basis (R. 40); that he had no knowledge of the 
defendant's family circumstances (R. 51); that he had no 
knowledge upon which he would act independent from what 
the evidence might show, and that he would judge the mat-
ter on the weight of the evidence (R. 52); that he presumed 
the defendant to be innocent and would so presume until 
it was proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt ( R. 
52); that he had not formed an opinion as to the defen-
dant's marital status (R. 52) ; that the fact that the defen-
dant was charged with an offense by the District Attorney 
would not be any evidence to him of the defendant's guilt 
(R. 53), and that if he were in the defendant's position 
he would be willing to submit his case to eight men like 
himself ( R. 53) . 
The trial court's inadvertent statement that Mr. Ohran 
showed no impartiality rather than no partiality lends no 
support to the defendant's contention. The judge previously 
had used the one term for the other but had corrected him-
self (R. 47, lines 28 to 30), and it is obvious from that which 
precedes the statement relied on that the judge meant to 
say, I don't think he shows any partiality. 
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Our statutes on challenge to the jury support the posi-
tion of the state on this point. Section 77-30-19, U. C. A. 
1953, so far as is pertinent, provides: 
"A challenge for implied bias may be taken for 
all or any of the following causes and for no other: 
* * * 
"(8) Having formed or expressed an unquali-
fied opinion or belief as to whether the defendant 
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." 
Section 77-30-21, U. C. A. 1953, states: 
"In a challenge for implied bias one or more of 
the causes stated in section 77-30-19 must be alleged. 
In a challenge for actual bias the cause stated in 
section 77-30-18 ( 2) must be alleged ; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or 
cause to be submitted to such jury founded upon 
public rumor, statements in public journals or com-
mon notoriety; provided, it appears to the court, 
upon his declaration under oath or otherwise, that 
he can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matters submitted 
to him. The challenge may be oral, but must be 
entered in the minutes of the court or noted by the 
reporter." 
Upon application of either or both statutes to the facts 
of this case it becomes clear that juror Ohran was com-
petent to serve. He had neither formed nor expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief on the defendant's guilt or 
innocence, and any tentative opinion he had formed was 
based on rumor, newspaper articles or common notoriety. 
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It has for years been the law in this state that it is an 
unqualified opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an ac-
cused which disqualifies a juror and in the absence of such 
an opinion he is competent to serve. People v. O'Loughlin 
(1882), 3 U. 133, 141, 1 P. 653. This court has further held 
that where a juror expresses a willingness to follow the 
directions of the court in deciding the issue, he is not dis-
qualified because of prior answers indicating bias. State v. 
DeWeese (1918), 51 U. 515, 172 P. 290, 293. In State v. 
BeBee (1946), 110 U. 484, 175 P. 2d 478, 482, the O'Lough-
lin and DeWeese cases were cited with approval and after 
discussing the statutes above quoted (U. C. A. 1943 cita-
tions), this court held that a juryman who had formed an 
opnion based on newspaper articles and rumors was never-
theless competent to render a fair and impartial verdict, 
and was properly retained on the panel. See also State v. 
Musser (1946), 110 U. 534, 175 P. 2d 724, 738. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that juror Ohran 
had formed a fixed opinion on the marital status of the 
defendant, there could have been no prejudice to him. His 
marital status was not in issue except with relation to the 
rule that a man is presumed to cohabit with his legally 
married wife, United States v. Clark (1889), 6 U. 120, 21 
P. 463, and the judge omitted to instruct the jury on this 
point (R. 237). Moreover, it was stipulated at the trial that 
defendant was lawfully married to the Amanda Kate Kil-
grow Barlow named in the information (R. 32, 33, Exhibit 
1) and there thenceforth was no dispute for the jury on 
that point. 
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POINT III. 
THE JURY WAS SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCT-
ED AS TO THE MEANING OF THE WORD 
"COHABIT." 
The defendant maintains that the court erred in failing 
to more fully define the word "cohabit" to the jury. This 
contention has no merit. Like many other offenses, un-
lawful cohabitation consists of a course of conduct and the 
prohibited course of conduct was explicitly set forth to the 
jury in instruction number 5. Further, the word itself has 
a usual, generally accepted meaning, presumably familiar 
to the jurors and is not a technical word. State v. Barlow 




EVIDENCE DESCRIBING CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXISTING PRIOR TO THE TIME OF THE 
OFFENSE CHARGED WAS RELEVANT TO 
SHO\V A CONTINUING CONDITION. 
Defendant complains specifically of Exhibits 36, 37, 
38 and 39 and the testimony of Mrs. Annie Roll (R. 159). 
In order for the State to prove a case it had to show a course 
of conduct by which the defendant was "* * * living, 
to all intents and purposes, so far as the public could see, 
as husband and wife * * *" with more than one 
woman. United States v. Cannon (1885), 4 U. 122, 7 P. 
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369. It was thus relevant to show the existence of a house-
hold and family being held out to the world with each of 
the women named in the information, and the school records 
tended to show that relationship. That some of the infor-
mation shown on the school records (Exhibits 36, 37 and 
38) deals with conditions outside the period is immaterial. 
The testimony showed that the information was gathered 
and the records compiled within the period set forth in the 
information. 
To the extent that the records deal with a condition 
that existed prior to the period charged, such a condition 
may be shown where there exists a probability that the 
condition continued to exist. On this point Wigmore on 
Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 437, states: 
"When the existence of an object, condition, 
quality, or tendency at a given time is in issue, the 
prior existence of it is in human experience some 
indication of its probable persistence or continuance 
at a later period." 
The hospital records referred to, Exhibit 39, are evidence 
of a family relationship between the defendant, Vio Fraser 
Barlow and their children prior to and during the period 
charged, and other evidence showed that this relationship 
continued during the period charged. It is true that defense 
counsel objected to their admission as hearsay, but those 
entries signed by the defendant were not hearsay, and 
counsel's objection was not specific but was addressed to 
the group of records. They were therefore properly ad-
mitted. 
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With respect to the testimony of Mrs. Annie Roll (R. 
159-166), it, too, was relevant to show a condition that 
existed at one time and which other evidence tended to 
show still existed. 
Again assuming, for argument, that the exhibits and 
testimony complained of were improperly admitted, the 
defendant was not prejudiced thereby. It was his theory 
in the trial, and is yet, that his course of conduct, to which 
the State pointed as evidence of guilt, was entirely inno-
cent by reason of his efforts to fill the role of a father to 
his children. His prior conviction for this offense was 
admitted and there was no attempt made to conceal the 
existence of the family relationships which the school and 
hospital records tended to show. 
Finally, on the point of relevance, the court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"And Instruction No. 10 I have amended to: 
You are instructed that the conduct of the defendant 
and other persons showing his relationship, if any, 
between Kate Amanda Kilgrow, Maurine Owen and 
Vio Fraser between April 30, 1952, and the 31st day 
of October, 1955, is the only evidence thaat [sic] 
can be considered by you in this matter and evidence 
of cohabitation during any other period is incom-
petent and immaterial, and unless you find the de-
fendant to have cohabited with any two or more of 
the three women between the dates set forth in the 
information you may find the defendant not guilty. 
(Instruction No. 10, as amended R. 234.)" 
By this instruction the jury were clearly advised of the 
evidence they could and could not consider in their deliber-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
ations. There can be no question that the evidence dealing 
with conditions prior to April 30, 1952, was considered only 
for the proper purposes for which it was introduced. 
B. 
NONE OF THE EVIDENCE COMPLAINED OF 
BY DEFENDANT WAS HEARSAY. 
The statements of defendant's daughter, Alhona, testi-
fied to by Shirley Broadbent (R. 86-95) were not introduced 
testimonially, i. e., to prove the truth of the statement, but 
as circumstantial evidence. It was relevant to show who 
this girl thought her father and mother were; it was evi-
dence of the family relationship. The hearsay rule is not 
applicable to such testimony. Wigmore on Evidence, Third 
Edition, Sections 1788 and 1789. 
It is alleged that the information contained on Exhibit 
15 is hearsay. This exhibit is a photostat of a birth certifi-
cate and is admissible as a copy of an official public record 
(see discussion on school records, below). But it is worth 
noting here that not all relevant parts of the record dealing 
with its admission are quoted in defendant's brief. Dr. 
Carl Andreasen was the witness on the stand and his testi-
mony begins at R. 146. He testified that he attended the 
birth of a child to Maurine Barlow and filled out a certifi-
cate of birth. The record then shows ( R. 148) : 
"Q. And calling your attention to what has 
been marked for identification as State's Exhibit 15 
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I will ask you, sir, if that is a photostat of the cer 
tificate which you filled out? 
"A. It is. 
"Q. And where did you obtain the informatior 
contained on that certificate? 
"A. From the people present during the birU 
of this child. 
"Q. And who were those people? 
"A. The defendant and Maurine Barlow. 
"Q. And who, sir, is listed as the father of 
that child on that certificate? 
"A. Albert E. Barlow. 
"Q. And from whom did you obtain that in-
formation? 
"A. I couldn't say whether the man or the 
woman that was present gave it to me. I obtained 
the information while waiting, which wasn't long. 
"Q. And calling your attention to the name of 
the mother which appears upon that certificate is 
your answer to that the same? 
"A. Yes, it is. The maiden name only is listed 
on it. 
"Q. And this was a female child born March 
13th, 1955? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is that your signature that appears there-
on, Doctor? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. We will offer at this time, Your Honor, 
State's Exhibit 15." 
It is clear that aside from the new born baby, only the wit-
ness, the defendant and Maurine Barlow were present. If 
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the. witness received the information from the defendant, 
it was an admission. If he received it from Maurine Barlow, 
it was an implied admission. Either alternative is an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. 
The objection to the testimony of Mrs. Arpin (R. 168) 
has no validity. The name by which other persons refer 
to someone is a fact and testimony concerning it is intro-
duced not to prove that it is his correct name but that he 
is known by that name. Wigmore, supra, Sections 1788, 
1789. 
Section 78-25-3, U. C. A. 1953, reads: 
"Entries in public or other official books or 
records, made in the performance of his duty by a 
public officer of this state or by any other person 
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by 
the law, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein." 
Boards of education were required by law to cause a school 
population census to be taken in the spring of 1954 (Laws 
of Utah 1953, First Special Session, Chapter 31, Section 
1) and the fall of 1955 (Laws of Utah 1955, Chapter 90, 
Section 1). Such school census records thus come within 
the statute above quoted and are not subject to the hearsay 
objection. See Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Company 
v. City of Richfield, (1934), 84 U. 107, 34 P. 2d 945; In Re 
Marks (1936), . . . Pa. . .. , 183 Atl. 432; Bozicevich v. 
Kenilworth Mercantile Company (1921), 58 U. 458, 199 
P. 406. 
With respect to the arguments advanced at pages 28 
and 29 of defendant's brief concerning alleged inconsisten-
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cies in the court's rulings on exhibits dealing with a period 
of time prior to April 30, 1952, it is difficult to understand 
the defendant's position. The documents discussed at R. 
189, and there admitted into evidence were school records, 
not birth certificates, and defense counsel withdrew his 
objection to the birth certificates involved at R. 208-212. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE CONVICTION. 
Viewed as a whole, the testimony of the 22 witnesses 
called by the State, the school records, birth certificates, 
marriage certificate, contract, hospital records and stipula-
tions entered into constitute an unmistakable mosaic of 
guilt on the part of the defendant. As recited in respon-
dent's statement of facts, his conduct over the period of 
time set forth in the information added up to only one thing 
-the holding out to the world of three women, each as his 
wife. 
With but very few exceptions, every indication from 
which one would normally conclude that his next door 
neighbor and the woman living with him are husband and 
wife ·was put in evidence in this case with respect to the 
defendant and the three women named in the information. 
He ate with them, stayed overnight with them, came and 
went from the homes with them, introduced them as his 
wives and was introduced by them as their husband, di-
rected activities in and around the homes, directed the 
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children, transacted important business with them, and 
fathered their recently born children in the case of two of 
them. 
We submit that the State has proved the course of 
conduct on defendant's part which the unlawful cohabita-
tion statute prohibits. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
K. ROGER BEAN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
and Respondent. 
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